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Hypothetical Cases
SARS Preparedness and Response
It was an unseasonably warm Friday morning
on 12 March 2004 in Anytown, Maryland.
Since 1 March 2004, the Department of
Homeland Security had raised the U.S. terror
alert level to code orange (high) based on
fresh intelligence reports from interviews with
Al Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
The Baltimore Orioles were in the process
of gearing up for another season. On Monday,
8 March 2004, 75 diehard baseball fans
returned to Dulles Airport on Orioles Airways
Flight 000, after watching the Orioles play a
series of spring training exhibition games in
Florida over the weekend.
One of the passengers on this Orioles
Airways Flight 000 was Mr. Smith, an
Anytown, Maryland, businessman who had
traveled to Taipei, Taiwan, for meetings during
the week of 1 March 2004. He had taken a
direct ﬂight to Taipei from Dulles Airport on
Monday, 1 March, with a stopover that day in
Munich, Germany; he had flown back to
Dulles on Thursday, 4 March, also with a
stopover in Munich. Upon returning to Dulles,
he spent the night at a hotel in McLean,
Virginia. He ﬂew the next morning, 5 March,
from Dulles to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on
Orioles Airways Flight 007 to watch his beloved
Orioles play a weekend’s worth of spring train-
ing games, before returning to Dulles on the
8 March Orioles Airways Flight 000.
Early on the morning of 8 March, before
boarding Flight 000, Mr. Smith developed a
sudden fever and dry cough, along with chills
and muscle aches. Despite these symptoms,
after the ﬂight he still managed to drive from
Dulles Airport to Anytown, Maryland. Within
2 hr of arriving at his apartment to his wife
and two children in Anytown, Mr. Smith’s
condition rapidly deteriorated, and he began
to have difficulty breathing. His wife drove
him to General Hospital emergency depart-
ment in Anytown.
Mr. Smith was admitted to the intensive
care unit at General Hospital on 8 March,
with a suspected clinical diagnosis of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Three days later (11 March), doctors
at one hospital in Washington, DC, one hos-
pital in Baltimore, and General Hospital in
Anytown admitted three patients each (total =
9 patients) with histories of acute onset of high
fever (> 38°C) and dry cough followed by
shortness of breath.
Upon taking a detailed travel history of
these patients, physicians determined that
seven of these nine patients (including the
three new patients presenting to General
Hospital in Anytown) had taken Orioles
Airways Flight 000 on 8 March 2004. Two
others had recently traveled to the United
States from Guangdong Province, China.
These developments were reported on a 24-hr
cable media outlet before local, state, and fed-
eral public health officials had a chance to
generate a formal press release.
Meanwhile, at General Hospital in
Anytown, the condition of Mr. Smith steadily
worsened despite aggressive treatment efforts,
and he died of respiratory failure on the
afternoon of 11 March.
By 2000 hr on 11 March, local, national,
and international media outlets had con-
verged upon Anytown, with a sea of televi-
sion trucks and satellite equipment gathered
outside General Hospital. The 911 system
became ﬂooded with calls from anxious citi-
zens throughout Anywhere County, and cell
phone networks were quickly overwhelmed
by call volume. The mayor of Anytown,
Maryland, and the local county health com-
missioner prepared to deliver a joint press
conference with the state health commis-
sioner at 2030 hr, followed by an address by
the president to the nation on these develop-
ments at 2100 hr.
By 13 March 2004, a total of 90 cases
of SARS were confirmed in Maryland,
Pennsylvania, northern Virginia, and the
District of Columbia. Twenty of these
patients had died thus far from respiratory
failure. The news of these deaths brought
added fear to the region and the nation.
Schools had been closed and unnecessary
gatherings canceled in Anytown and the rest
of the affected region for the past 2 days.
Epidemiologic workup by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
in conjunction with state and local health
departments revealed that most cases in this
SARS outbreak were traceable to Mr. Smith,
the Anytown businessman who had been
exposed to SARS while on business in Taipei
and who subsequently exposed fellow passen-
gers on Orioles Airways Flight 000 because of
a faulty on-plane ventilation system. The
remaining cases were traced to the two travel-
ers to Baltimore who came from Guangdong
Province in China.
Questions. What are the hospital infec-
tion control issues associated with a SARS
outbreak, and what are the most effective
approaches to address these issues? What type
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State and local health departments continue to face unprecedented challenges in preparing for,
recognizing, and responding to threats to the public’s health. The attacks of 11 September 2001
and the ensuing anthrax mailings of 2001 highlighted the public health readiness and response
hurdles posed by intentionally caused injury and illness. At the same time, recent natural disasters
have highlighted the need for comparable public health readiness and response capabilities. Public
health readiness and response activities can be conceptualized similarly for intentional attacks, nat-
ural disasters, and human-caused accidents. Consistent with this view, the federal government has
adopted the all-hazards response model as its fundamental paradigm. Adoption of this paradigm
provides powerful improvements in efﬁciency and efﬁcacy, because it reduces the need to create a
complex family of situation-specific preparedness and response activities. However, in practice,
public health preparedness requires additional models and tools to provide a framework to better
understand and prioritize emergency readiness and response needs, as well as to facilitate solu-
tions; this is particularly true at the local health department level. Here, we propose to extend the
use of the Haddon matrix—a conceptual model used for more than two decades in injury preven-
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[Online 2 February 2005]of advance planning strategy could a local
public health department use to identify the
contributing factors to this public health
emergency? What approaches could a local
public health department use to deliver com-
prehensive public health prevention, inter-
vention, and risk communication measures
before, during, and after such an outbreak?
“Dirty Bomb” Preparedness and
Response
It was late in the afternoon on a typically
warm, humid, sunny 4 July afternoon in
Anytown, Maryland. Thousands were gath-
ered at the Anywhere County fairgrounds in
Anytown in preparation for that evening’s
upcoming parade and celebration, and the
crowds were currently enjoying an outdoor
concert and other festivities. Police estimated
the afternoon’s crowd at the fairgrounds at
approximately 10,000.
There was a breeze blowing westward at
10 miles/hr, cooling the fairground crowd
slightly and making them a little more com-
fortable. Tens of thousands more were en
route to Anytown for the evening’s celebration
via the major highways, including I-95, I-495,
and I-270. There was heavy freeway conges-
tion at this hour outside downtown Anytown.
Warnings from the Department of Homeland
Security had been issued for vigilance during
the 4 July holiday weekend, but the nature of
this terrorist threat had been nonspeciﬁc, and
the nation had been at a U.S. terror alert level
of code yellow on this 4 July holiday.
It was estimated that 7,500 of the 10,000
people at the fairgrounds this afternoon were
attending the concert. About 30 min into
the show, a man driving a white van on Any
Parkway suddenly stopped at the main
entrance to the fairgrounds, about 50 yd from
the concert venue. Ten seconds later the van
exploded in a massive ﬁreball, the blast hurl-
ing ﬁery shrapnel into the crowd.
The explosion killed 300 people instantly
and injured 2,000 more in the adjacent crowd,
and the blast could be heard over a 5-mile
radius. Smoke emanating from the resulting
ﬁre was visible to motorists on the congested
freeways and roads leading to the fairgrounds.
Within moments of the blast, thousands
of people began ﬂeeing from the fairgrounds.
Motorists hearing the blast and seeing the
smoke from area freeways and roads began to
use their cell phones simultaneously by the
thousands. Cellular phone systems rapidly
became ﬂooded.
On Monday, 8 July, an Associated Press
wire bulletin surfaced that three moisture
density gauges—each containing 10 mCi
cesium-137—were ﬁrst reported missing that
morning from a construction site on Mary-
land’s Eastern Shore. The site manager said
the gauges were last seen on 1 July, the day
before the construction crew left the site for
the extended holiday weekend.
Given this new information, public safety
authorities had a high index of suspicion that
this terrorist blast may have been caused by a
“dirty bomb” containing the cesium-137
from the Eastern Shore construction site.
Environmental sampling revealed elevated
radiation levels at the site of the explosion,
consistent with this hypothesis.
In the several weeks after the attacks,
emergency rooms noted a surge in patients
coming in for anxiety-related symptoms. Area
pharmacies were flooded with prescriptions
for anxiolytic and antidepressant medications.
Community mental health services were being
strained as Anytown citizens attempted to
come to grips with the horror of this terrorist
attack. Many residents of Anytown stated they
would never return to the city again because
they believed the area would never be ade-
quately decontaminated.
Questions. What are the potential environ-
mental impacts of a dirty bomb? What can be
done to prepare for and respond to such
impacts? How would local, state, and federal
public health and partner emergency response
agencies work together in this scenario? What
steps would be taken to distinguish a dirty
bomb vs. from another type of explosion? What
steps would be taken to evacuate, contain, and
decontaminate the affected area? Would evacu-
ation involve all of Anywhere County? Who
would take the lead in communicating timely,
accurate information to the public on radiation
terror before, during, and after this event? What
would the crisis- and consequence-phase mental
health service responses be to an attack on
Anytown by a “dirty bomb”? What steps, if
any, could have prevented this attack from
occurring or could have reduced the number of
deaths and injuries?
Discussion
The Haddon matrix. The ﬁeld of injury pre-
vention has long provided solution-oriented
models for understanding threats to the
public’s health. Industry and public health ofﬁ-
cials alike have applied these models to reduce
morbidity and mortality from a variety of
injury types. The Haddon matrix, developed
by William Haddon, has been used for more
than two decades in injury prevention research
and intervention. The Haddon matrix is a grid
with four columns and three rows. The rows
represent different phases of an injury (pre-
event, event, and postevent), and the columns
represent different influencing factors (host,
agent/vehicle, physical environment, social
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Table 1. The Haddon matrix and pedestrian injury from automobiles.
Inﬂuencing factors
Phase Host Agent/vehicle Physical environment Social environment
Preevent Intoxicated driver Speeding automobile Poor street lighting Unenforced speed limit laws
Fatigued driver Worn tires Slick pavement Inadequate investment
in crosswalks
Pedestrian crossing street Worn brakes Potholes
Inadequate signage
Nighttime
Intoxicated pedestrian
Elderly pedestrian
Pedestrian with osteoporosis Momentum of automobile
Event Pedestrian wearing headphones Hospitals nearby with Good samaritan laws
specialty in trauma care
Hearing-impaired pedestrian Impact of automobile
with pedestrian
Part of pedestrian’s body Portion of vehicle Part of body impacting ground
struck by vehicle impacting pedestrian
Postevent Ability of victim to recover Severity of physical injuries Rehabilitation facility Health insurance
Postinjury care received
Severity of postevent
psychological impact
Access to rehabilitation services
Psychological coping of victim Family and social support
in aftermath of eventenvironment). Table 1 illustrates a basic appli-
cation of the Haddon matrix to pedestrian
trafﬁc safety.
The host column represents the person
or persons at risk of injury. The agent of
injury impacts the host through a vehicle
(inanimate object) or vector (person or other
animal/organism). Physical environment refers
to the actual setting where the injury occurs.
Sociocultural and legal norms of a community
constitute the social environment. The phases
of an event are depicted on the matrix as a con-
tinuum beginning before the event (preevent),
the event itself (event phase), and sequelae of
the event (postevent phase).
The terminology used for the factors of the
matrix can be adapted for different contexts;
for example, “agent” may be more appropriate
than “vector” in certain cases, and “organiza-
tional culture” might be used in addition to or
instead of “social environment” (Tables 2–4)
when focusing on an institutional context.
Through its phase-factor approach, the
Haddon matrix meshes concepts of primary,
secondary, and tertiary prevention with the
concept of the host/agent/environmental
interface as a target for delivering public
health interventions (Runyan 1998). Each cell
of the matrix represents a distinct locus for
identifying strategies to prevent, respond to,
or mitigate injuries or other public health
challenges (Runyan 1998). By dissecting a
problem into its dimensions of time and con-
tributing factors, the Haddon matrix can be
applied as a practical, user-friendly interdisci-
plinary brainstorming and planning tool to
help understand, prepare for, and respond to
a broad range of public health emergencies
(Runyan 2003).
The Haddon matrix and new readiness
challenges for public health. As an integral
component of homeland security in the
post–11 September environment, the public
health infrastructure faces new and signiﬁcant
challenges of recognizing and responding to
Article | Haddon matrix and public health response planning
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Table 2. The Haddon matrix and public health emergency readiness and response—a conceptual overview.
Inﬂuencing factors
Phase Host Agent/vector Physical environment Social environment/organizational culture
Preevent Risk assessment Properties of biologic, chemical Existing clinical infrastructure Need for culture of readiness among
radiologic, or other agents Vulnerability of food and water supplies public health and other ﬁrst responders
Preevent risk Capacity of agent as WMD Transportation infrastructure Knowing one’s functional role(s) in
communication emergency response*
Preevent Potential for re-engineering of agent Demonstrating use of communication
surveillance to produce unexpected health effects equipment*
Primary prevention Proximity of community to chemical and Knowing one’s communication role(s)
(e.g., preevent radiation facilities in emergency response*
vaccination)
Preparedness Identifying key system resources for
training for public referring matters that exceed one’s
health responders personal knowledge and expertise*
Interagency ﬁrst Participation in readiness exercises
response planning and drills
Baseline community trust in public
health and other response agencies
Public acceptance of preevent risk
communication
Culturally based preevent risk perception
Public awareness of large-scale threats
Demographics of community
Event Crisis risk Disease or injury caused by agent Emergency response clinic setup and Community responses to crisis risk
communication operations communication
Decontamination and Response of the agent to Emergency access to medical supplies Community adherence to public health
treatment decontamination and treatment efforts (e.g., Strategic National Stockpile) guidance during event
Sheltering Potential for agent detection Clinical surge capacity Culturally based crisis-phase risk
perception
Postexposure Psychosocial impact of agent during Shelter availability Access of community to crisis response
prophylaxis event clinics
Crisis-phase mental Acute health effects of agent Emergency accessibility of transportation
health response
Crisis-phase interagency
ﬁrst response
collaboration
Epidemiological workup
(including forensic
epidemiology as applicable)
Evacuation
Postevent Consequence-phase Long-term psychosocial impact of agent Application of lessons learned to better Community responses to postevent
risk communication safeguard vulnerable infrastructure risk communication
Application of lessons Response of agent to mitigation and Willingness of public health responders to
learned to improve cleanup efforts embrace lessons learned
response systems
Consequence-phase
mental health response Postevent community trust in public
health and other response agencies
Postevent health Culturally based consequence-phase
surveillance risk perception
Mitigation and cleanup
After action assessment
and follow-up
WMD, weapons of mass destruction.
*Potential targets for public health intervention.a broad range of intentional and naturally
occurring large-scale threats. Furthermore,
since the anthrax attacks of 2001, the concept
of public health emergency preparedness in
the United States has evolved and expanded
from a bioterrorism focus to an all-hazards
readiness and response model. The all-hazards
approach means that the infrastructure and
skill sets used to prepare for and respond to a
bioterrorism event can also be applied to a
wide spectrum of current and emerging nat-
ural and intentional threats to the public’s
health, ranging from an infectious disease
outbreak to a weather-related disaster.
Effective public health emergency pre-
paredness and response requires appropriate
preevent, event (crisis phase), and postevent
(consequence phase) activities. In the context
of emergency readiness, preevent activities
include risk assessment, risk communication,
and primary prevention efforts (e.g., preevent
vaccination). Event-phase public health activi-
ties involve crisis risk communication and
community-based medical interventions such
as postexposure prophylaxis and treatment,
crisis mental health counseling, and isolation/
quarantine measures. Postevent activities
involve consequence-phase disaster mitigation
and treatment of longer-term physical and
mental health sequelae, along with ongoing
risk communication and recovery efforts.
Table 2 presents a conceptual overview of
public health emergency preparedness and
response activities and competencies and how
they might be illustrated using the Haddon
matrix. Items with asterisks on Table 2 are
CDC-adopted emergency preparedness compe-
tencies for all public health workers developed
by the Columbia University School of Nursing
Center for Health Policy (2002). This high-
level view of the issues faced by those preparing
for emergencies demonstrates the multidimen-
sional ﬂexibility of the Haddon matrix.
Each phase of a public health emergency
presents a unique set of demands on health
departments in their readiness and response
efforts. Allocating resources for these phases
is a significant challenge in the face of com-
peting public health priorities and resource
demands. These preevent/event/postevent
phase challenges and the organizational ﬂexi-
bility requirements of an all-hazards response
model can quickly become overwhelming for
public health departments.
By breaking a larger problem into smaller,
more manageable components, the Haddon
matrix provides a practical, efﬁcient decision-
making and planning tool that health depart-
ment leaders can use to better understand
current and emerging threats, perform vulnera-
bility assessments, prioritize and allocate readi-
ness and response resources, and maintain
institutional agility in responding to an array of
public health emergencies.
Health department leaders can use the
Haddon matrix as a planning instrument to
dissect the required preparedness and response
requirements for any public health emergency
scenario, and then strategize to meet these
requirements using a “divide and conquer”
approach. Once the Haddon matrix has been
filled in for a given type of emergency, the
cells of the completed matrix comprise speciﬁc
preevent, event, and postevent task-oriented
items that leaders can assign to appropriate
staff to optimize their agency’s readiness and
response. Some of these items within the com-
pleted Haddon matrix may be more respon-
sive than others to public health prevention
and intervention, or may represent more
pressing needs for a given community; this
allows health department leaders to prioritize
these assigned tasks based on the health
department’s unique demands and resources.
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Table 3. The Haddon matrix and SARS hospital infection control.
Inﬂuencing factors
Phase Host Agent/vector Physical environment Social environment/organizational culture
Preevent Preevent training of staff Level of contagiousness Availability of PPE* Preevent employee awareness of daily
in outbreak infection infection control practices*
control practices*
Case mix of patients in Incubation period Availability of predesignated outbreak Organizational culture of staff adherence
the hospital infection control checklists and forms* to hospital directives and protocols*
Surveillance for SARS Subclinical infection Hospital infection control infrastructure Cultural competency of preevent risk
within hospital by (e.g. negative pressure rooms)* communication to hospital staff*
health care providers*
Preevent public health Level of contagiousness Laboratory facilities* Budget (preparedness resource allocation)*
risk communication*
Lethality Plans for increased surge capacity*
Potential modes of transmission Proximity of hospital to international
airports and borders*
Event Mental health support for Mode(s) of dissemination of virus Hospital surge capacity Hospital staff’s trust in administrators’
hospital staff during event* during actual outbreak crisis management performance
Staff adherence to hospital Availability of designated SARS hospitals Budget (response resource utilization)
infection control protocols in vicinity
Isolation and quarantine Communication network systems capacity Incident command system put into action*
implementation
Risk communication during Crisis-designated incident command system Media accuracy and bias toward health
event to staff and patients* for hospital infection control care providers
Efﬁciency of medication and equipment Culturally and scientiﬁcally appropriate/
delivery (e.g., Strategic National Stockpile)* consistent SARS messages to hospital
staff and patients*
Moral support to affected health care
community*
Patient and family compliance with
hospital infection control protocols
Postevent Postevent risk Persistence of agent in environment Postevent decontamination options Cultural competency of postevent
communication for affected facility messages*
Postmortem management Restoration of Strategic National Stockpile Governmental ﬁnancial support of
medication and equipment* affected hospitals*
Psychology of postevent Ongoing mental health support and
reactions followup*
Postevent surveillance Economic impact on affected community
PPE, personal protective equipment.
*Potential targets for public health intervention.The Haddon matrix can also serve as a
helpful after-action evaluation tool to assess a
health department’s performance in achieving
the goals of a preparedness exercise, or in
responding effectively to a real-life event. In
this context, the tasks within each cell become
items for performance evaluation that can
contribute to an effective, comprehensive
after-action report.
A view of readiness challenges through the
lens of the Haddon matrix also promotes efﬁ-
cient use of public health resources, because
the matrix can reveal strategies that allow
multiple issues to be addressed by one solu-
tion. For example, the logistics of trying to
anticipate every possible source of attack or
emergency are staggering and impractical.
The establishment of an effective incident
command system and flexible emergency
operations plan within a health department
facilitates a more effective response regardless
of the emergency. Through the use of the
Haddon matrix, it becomes much more likely
that public health departments will be able
to maximize their readiness efforts, because
policies and procedures that are identiﬁed as
clearly beneﬁcial in multiple scenarios can be
developed ahead of less generalizable efforts.
The Haddon matrix also promotes effi-
cient resource allocation by focusing on appro-
priate phase responses. Because the matrix
requires the user to follow issues across all of
the phases of an event, problems that seem
insurmountable during one phase might have
ready solutions in a different phase. For exam-
ple, the logistics of adequately sheltering a
population upon the release of an infectious
disease become much more manageable with a
“preevent” educated population that under-
stands the concepts of sheltering in place,
emergency supply kits, and resources for addi-
tional trustworthy information.
The model shows considerable flexibility
as a tool to address threats—both intentional
and unintentional—that face public health
departments in their efforts to enhance public
health readiness and response. From SARS to
dirty bombs, the Haddon matrix reveals itself
as a useful public health readiness tool for
tackling difﬁcult public health emergencies.
SARS preparedness and response: a
Haddon matrix analysis. SARS is an example
of a naturally occurring public health epi-
demic that can be better understood and
addressed via the Haddon matrix. From diag-
nosis, to treatment, to infection control, to
risk communication, SARS is an infectious
disease that exacts signiﬁcant stress on multi-
ple facets of the public health infrastructure
(Affonso et al. 2004; Gostin et al. 2003).
A myriad of public health response issues
surround a SARS outbreak. Table 3 shows an
example of the Haddon matrix as applied
to one such issue: SARS hospital infection
control. This SARS model of the Haddon
matrix views infectious disease as a form of
injury affecting the population on a broad
scale. The model allows its users to better
understand the multidimensional nature of
the epidemic and to identify targets for pre-
vention, mitigation, and intervention. By
identifying targeted points of intervention
(noted with asterisks in Table 3), we can dis-
cover potential measures to successfully miti-
gate the public health threat before, during,
and after a SARS event.
Table 3 illustrates some of the hospital
infection control factors that should be
Article | Haddon matrix and public health response planning
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Table 4. The Haddon matrix and environmental impact of dirty bombs.
Inﬂuencing factors
Phase Host Agent/vehicle Physical environment Social environment/organizational culture
Preevent Malicious intent of Sources of ionizing radiation Fresh water First responders’ preevent risk perception
terrorist of radiation terror*
Access of terrorist to Types of ionizing radiation Power supply Cultural competency of preevent risk
explosives and (electromagnetic vs. particulate) communication messages to ﬁrst
radiation responders*
Level of Hazmat teams’ Properties of ionizing radiation Security of industrial/medical facilities Awareness of ﬁrst responders to public
preparedness and training (e.g., half-life, carcinogenicity) where radiation is stored* health threat of radiation terror*
Preevent surveillance of Availability of PPE for Hazmat teams Existing laws and regulations on
environmental radiation* radiologic cleanup*
Availability of decontamination Budget (preparedness resource allocation)*
equipment for Hazmat teams
Availability of communication Insurance
equipment*
Availability of radiation detection
equipment for non-Hazmat ﬁrst responders
Proximity of community to radiologic
hazards
Climate
Geography
Event Malicious execution Mode of radioactive material Weather conditions during event Cultural competency of public health
of terrorist act dispersion: air, water, soil, or food messages for ﬁrst responders*
Implementation of detection Proper functioning of decontamination Incident command system put into action*
and decontamination efforts equipment
Intra-agency and interagency Communication systems surge Budget (response resource utilization)*
communications and capacity*
collaboration*
Transportation systems Executive orders by elected ofﬁcials
and community compliance
Time, distance, and shielding
of affected communities
Postevent Physical and psychological Persistence of agent in environment Weather (e.g., wind direction, Cultural competency of postevent public
impacts on Hazmat personnel temperature) health messages*
and ﬁrst responders
Postevent environmental Postevent control options based on agent Economic impact on affected community
surveillance of radiation* and mode of dispersion (cleanup, disposal)
Postevent risk communication* Environmental remediation and regulation*
Postevent media coverage
PPE, personal protective equipment.
*Potential targets for public health intervention.considered in the event of an emerging infec-
tious disease outbreak such as SARS (Loutfy
et al. 2004; Svoboda et al. 2004). Lessons
on public health readiness are often learned
painfully after large crises, as was the case dur-
ing the SARS outbreak of 2003 (Campbell
2004; Hearne et al. 2004). Using the Haddon
matrix before an event occurs allows us to
consider the interplay of variables that might
otherwise have been missed (and were missed
during the actual events associated with the
SARS outbreak). For example, in the pre-
event phase under physical environment, the
Haddon matrix reveals the importance of
addressing the need for adequate personal pro-
tective equipment; this may seem obvious
enough in hindsight, but this issue received
insufficient attention before the SARS out-
breaks in 2003 (Campbell 2004; Reznikovich
and Balicer 2004).
Equally important, the model is flexible
enough to allow for big picture analysis of a
situation, or a more focused analysis of the
smallest units of study, including individuals.
As a tool to understand, prepare for, and
respond to SARS, the Haddon matrix thus
reveals itself as a highly adaptable model.
“Dirty bomb” preparedness and response:
a Haddon matrix analysis. From a public
health emergency readiness standpoint, the
Haddon matrix’s adaptability also extends to
environmental impacts of nonbiologic origin.
Radiation terror preparedness, for example, is
a significant challenge in the emerging all-
hazards public health readiness framework,
because the physical and mental health
impacts of radiation terror on an affected area
can be profound and long lasting.
Radiologic dispersal devices (“dirty
bombs”) are examples of radiation terror that
present a challenge for homeland security
because of their simplicity and relative ease of
acquisition. Dirty bombs are conventional
explosives bundled with ionized radioactive
sources, and remain a front-line terrorism pre-
paredness concern in the post-11 September
era (Zimmerman and Loeb 2004).
Applying the Haddon matrix to the threat
of a dirty bomb illustrates the value of this
injury prevention model as a public health
readiness and response tool, even when focus-
ing exclusively on environmental issues. Table 4
shows how the Haddon matrix can be applied
to address environmental health issues related
to dirty bombs. Although the human, agent,
physical, and social factors are numerous, a
closer look reveals a more speciﬁc set of points
for targeting environmental assessment and
intervention (Table 4).
Like the Haddon matrix for SARS in
Table 3, the Haddon matrix for dirty bombs in
Table 4 reveals the host, social environmental/
organizational culture, and selected physical
environmental dimensions as major points
of impact for public health assessment and
intervention (noted with asterisks). Hazardous
materials (Hazmat) and other ﬁrst-responder
agency personnel would comprise the front
lines at the scene of a dirty bomb event, rather
than health department workers. Nonetheless,
a comparison between the dirty bomb and
SARS Haddon matrix examples shows marked
similarities in the importance of risk com-
munication, mental health support, resource
use, surge capacity, and effective surveillance
as points of public health impact, consistent
with an all-hazards readiness and response
framework.
Table 4 reveals that from an environmental
perspective, modiﬁable public health “impact”
opportunities for dirty bomb preparedness and
response involve mainly organizational culture/
social environment factors, as well as a few host
and physical environment factors. The legal
and regulatory aspects of environmental reme-
diation after a dirty bomb are critical public
health issues with signiﬁcant economic impli-
cations (Elcock et al. 2004); these are also
reﬂected in Table 4 as “impact” opportunities
on the Haddon matrix.
Collectively, these modiﬁable host, physi-
cal environment, and social environment/
organizational culture factors represent targets
for streamlining readiness and response activi-
ties; addressing the safety, risk perception, and
mental health needs of first responders and
Hazmat personnel; and managing the ﬁnancial
resource and response issues of a dirty bomb—
all of which are critical pieces in dealing with
the environmental impacts of a dirty bomb.
Conclusion
The applied examples of SARS and dirty
bombs illustrate the utility and flexibility of
the Haddon matrix as a tool for understand-
ing, preparing for, and reacting to a spectrum
of intentional and naturally occurring public
health threats.
Following the principle that “all disasters
are local,” the Haddon matrix can provide a
tool for public health agencies to address spe-
ciﬁc gaps and requirements that must be ﬁlled
to meet their communities’ unique readiness
needs. Additionally, the Haddon matrix can
serve as a helpful model for disaster prepared-
ness and response in a variety of contexts,
from public health readiness policy develop-
ment to local public health practice emergency
response planning.
As an effective creative brainstorming and
planning tool, it is ideally suited to facilitate
tabletop preparedness exercises at health
departments in cooperation with partner ﬁrst-
response agencies. It can assist in needs assess-
ment efforts for public health agencies and
their stakeholders. It also can serve as a valuable
classroom aid in teaching public health readi-
ness concepts at the secondary and graduate
school levels, helping future public health lead-
ers to develop critical problem-solving skills
needed to tackle difﬁcult readiness challenges.
These examples and their potential appli-
cations highlight ﬁve essential features of the
Haddon matrix as a tool for public health
emergency readiness and response. First, the
Haddon matrix provides a framework for
understanding a terrorism incident in a tempo-
ral context, including its preevent, event (cri-
sis), and postevent (consequence) phases.
Second, it can effectively dissect these temporal
phases of a public health event into their con-
tributing factors. Third, it can aid in a public
health agency’s vulnerability assessment of its
preparedness and response capacities. Fourth,
it can provide health departments with a useful
framework for developing these capacities to
deliver a prioritized, targeted approach to the
public health dimensions of terrorism preven-
tion and response. Fifth, it is a sufﬁciently ﬂex-
ible analytic tool to aid health departments in
addressing virtually any type of intentional or
naturally occurring public health emergency.
The dissection of SARS and dirty bombs
by the Haddon matrix reveals how widely dis-
parate public health challenges can be tackled
by a user-friendly and efﬁcient injury preven-
tion conceptual model. A renewed look at the
Haddon matrix thus shows this tool to be a
vital link between public health preparedness
and injury prevention science.
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